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THE INSIDER TRADING PROHIBITION ACT:
A SMALL STEP TOWARDS A CODIFIED INSIDER
TRADING LAW
Kayla Quigley*
ABSTRACT
Many have called for reform to insider trading law, as the current
judge-made doctrine is ambiguous, complicated, and ultimately
permissive of many instances of trading on nonpublic information.
Indeed, Congress has attempted several times to pass a uniform
insider trading statute. Most recently, in December 2019, the House
of Representatives passed the Insider Trading Prohibition Act
(“ITPA”). The legislation codifies many current principles of insider
trading jurisprudence while also expanding potential insider trading
liability. Moreover, it attempts to fix gaps in the law that various
cases, such as United States v. Newman, have declined to address.
Among other flaws, by requiring a tippee to know that the initial
tipper received a personal benefit, Newman has made it extremely
difficult for the Government to prosecute remote tippees in long
tipping chains. This essentially permits insider trading in such
situations, which often involve sophisticated investors at large hedge
funds. The ITPA would properly eliminate this requirement that the
tippee know of the tipper’s personal benefit, instead shifting the
focus of the analysis to whether the tippee knew that the information
itself was obtained wrongfully.
Legislation is advantageous because it provides notice and due
process in a way that judge-made law cannot. Moreover, recent
convoluted cases have left significant gaps that would best be filled
by clearly drafted legislation. Although the ITPA is a step in the
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right direction towards a codified insider trading law, it is not a
perfect solution. This Note briefly explains the development of
insider trading law and the ITPA itself, identifies some of the Act’s
current flaws, and proposes various improvements. The ITPA would
benefit from enhanced clarity, separate standards for criminal and
civil liability, and a more expansive definition of “personal benefit.”
A broadened definition provides an opportunity to distinguish
between information used for legitimate and illegitimate corporate
purposes. In sum, the altered definition seeks a balance between
preventing improper motives and preserving incentives for diligent
market research.
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INTRODUCTION
Chris Collins, a former member of the U.S. House of
Representatives, became ensnared in a highly publicized insider trading
scandal in 2018.1 As a major stakeholder in the Australian biotech
company Innate Immunotherapeutics, Collins received private
information that the company’s only product had failed a “do-or-die”
drug trial.2 He immediately called his son, Cameron Collins, from the
White House lawn, who subsequently sold his stock.3
When the news of the failed drug trial became public, the
company’s stock price dropped 90%.4 Cameron saved more than
$570,000 by trading before the news was released.5 Cameron also
passed the information along to his fiancée and her father, Stephen
Zarksy, who also sold his shares to avoid losses.6 Chris Collins,
Cameron Collins, and Stephen Zarksy were all charged with insider
trading.7 Chris Collins faced up to ten years in prison, but was sentenced
to twenty-six months after pleading guilty.8 Mr. Zarksy’s wife, daughter,
and brother also sold their holdings before the price dropped, but did not
face any charges.9
This case is a small example of just how many parties can be
involved in an insider trading scheme. Often, complex cases of remote

1. Alan Feuer & Shane Goldmacher, New York Congressman Chris Collins Is
Charged With Insider Trading, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 8, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/08/08/nyregion/chris-collins-insider-trading.html [https://perma.cc/GG4Q-2SLR].
2. Id.
3. Kevin Breuninger, Former GOP Rep. Chris Collins pleads guilty in insider
trading case, CNBC (Oct. 1, 2019, 4:40 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/01/
former-gop-rep-chris-collins-pleads-guilty-in-insider-trading-case.html
[https://perma.cc/PU97-AYM4].
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Feuer, supra note 1.
7. Id.
8. Erin Durkin, Collins Sentenced to 26 Months for Insider Trading Scheme,
POLITICO (Jan. 17, 2020, 5:58 PM), https://www.politico.com/states/new-york/albany/
story/2020/01/17/collins-sentenced-to-26-months-for-insider-trading-scheme-1252648
[https://perma.cc/B6LX-362T]. President Trump later pardoned Collins. Bruce Golding,
Disgraced ex-pol Chris Collins released from prison after Trump pardon, N.Y. POST
(Dec. 23, 2020), https://nypost.com/2020/12/23/ex-pol-chris-collins-released-fromprison-after-trump-pardon/ [https://perma.cc/CS82-BKAP].
9. Feuer, supra note 1.
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tipping10 prove difficult, if not impossible, to prosecute given the current
state of insider trading jurisprudence.11 Indeed, this may be why
prosecutors did not indict Mr. Zarksy’s wife, daughter, and brother in
the Collins case.12 Many have urged for reform of insider trading law, as
the current compilation of judge-made law is ambiguous, contradictory,
and ultimately allows many instances of trading on nonpublic
information to occur legally.13
Many scholars debate the justifications and efficacy of insider
trading prohibitions.14 Some claim insider trading regulation is
“unnecessary and counterproductive,” focusing instead on the benefits
such trading brings to the market, including “prompt price adjustment to
new private information.”15 Others justify regulation for reasons
including the need to promote public disclosure and to protect
confidential information as a form of corporate property.16 These
debates have taken heightened significance after the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit’s decision in United States v. Newman.17
Many have called for legislation from Congress, and there have been
previous attempts to enact a law.18 Most recently, the House of
10. The term “remote” tippee is used to refer to a tippee who is “at least one degree
removed from the original tipper.” Kathleen Coles, The Dilemma of the Remote Tippee,
41 GONZ. L. REV. 181, 184 n.18 (2006). Thus, it will be used throughout this Note to
refer to a situation such as an insider-tipper giving information to an initial tippee, and
that tippee then passing it to another.
11. See infra Section II.A.2.
12. See Andrew C. Spacone, The Second Circuit’s Curious Journey Through the
Law of Tippee Liability for Insider Trading: Newman to Martoma, 24 ROGER
WILLIAMS UNIV. L. REV. 1, 7, 43 (2019).
13. See infra Section II.B.1.
14. See JAMES D. COX, ROBERT W. HILLMAN, DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, ANN M.
LIPTON & WILLIAM K. SJOSTROM, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS
868 (9th ed. 2020).
15. See id. (“Some economics-oriented legal scholars remain convinced that insider
trading regulation is both unnecessary and counterproductive in that it frustrates prompt
price adjustment to new private information.”).
16. See id. (“Others justify restriction on a diverse set of grounds: the reduction of
informational asymmetry as a means of lowering market transaction costs, the
elimination of disincentives to prompt public disclosure of information by management,
and–perhaps most commonly–the desire to protect confidential information as a form of
corporate property.”).
17. 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014).
18. See PREET BHARARA ET AL., REPORT OF THE BHARARA TASK FORCE ON INSIDER
TRADING 9 (2020).
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Representatives passed the Insider Trading Prohibition Act (“ITPA” or
the “Act”), which attempts to codify many aspects of current insider
trading jurisprudence and to fix many of the gaps that exist after
Newman.19
Part I of this Note briefly explains the development of insider
trading law. Part II introduces the changes the ITPA would make and
analyzes certain flaws in current insider trading jurisprudence. Part III
discusses whether the ITPA poses any improvement and recommends
adjustments to the bill. Ultimately, the Act would benefit from more
explanatory language, differing standards of civil and criminal liability,
and a broadened definition of personal benefit.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF CURRENT INSIDER TRADING
JURISPRUDENCE
A. THE HISTORY OF RULE 10B-5 AND ITS INTERPRETATION
Congress has never legislated “with any degree of precision” a
prohibition on insider trading.20 In fact, federal securities laws did not
exist until the 1930s,21 when the Securities Act of 1933 (the “Securities
Act”) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”)
were enacted.22 Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act is the basis for
modern insider trading jurisprudence, although it is not explicit in this
function.23
Pursuant to Section 10(b), it is illegal to “use or employ, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security . . . any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention” of
19. See Insider Trading Prohibition Act, H.R. 2534, 116th Cong. (2019); see also
Lyle Roberts, The Insider Trading Law Is Bad. Will Congress Make It Worse?, WALL
ST. J. (Jan. 9, 2020, 6:58 PM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-insider-tradinglaw-is-bad-will-congress-make-it-worse-11578614315 [https://perma.cc/54HH-3JVS].
20. COX, supra note 14, at 867. Although Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 allows an issuer affected by insider trading to recover insider short-swing
profits, it is limited in scope and hardly used. Id.; see also Stephen M. Bainbridge,
Incorporating State Law Fiduciary Duties into the Federal Insider Trading Prohibition,
52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1189, 1229 (1995).
21. See COX ET AL., supra note 14, at 19.
22. See id. at 5–7.
23. See United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 445 (2d Cir. 2014) (“Although
Section 10(b) was designed as a catch-all clause to prevent fraudulent practices . . .
neither the statute nor the regulations issued pursuant to it, including Rule 10b-5,
expressly prohibit insider trading.”) (internal citation omitted).
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any rules or regulations of the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC).24 Further, SEC Rule 10b-5 prohibits any person
from employing “any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud . . . in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security.”25 Based on this
provision, insider trading jurisprudence subsequently developed in what
Judge Jed S. Rakoff has described as a “topsy-turvy” fashion.26
In the 1960s, the SEC began relying on these antifraud provisions
to prohibit corporate insiders from trading based on material nonpublic
information.27 Initially, courts accepted an “equal access” theory of
insider trading.28 Essentially, those who benefitted from inside
information disturbed the expectation of markets that all investors “have
relatively equal access to material information.”29 Thus, anyone who
obtained material nonpublic information had a duty to either “disclose it
to the investing public . . . [or] abstain from trading.”30 It was critical
that the trading entailed some form of manipulation or deception.31
Eventually, the Supreme Court rejected this equal access theory and
instead embraced the “classical theory”32 as a way to limit the scope of
insider trading liability.33 In Chiarella v. United States, the Court
explained that Section 10(b) does not create a duty to disclose when
“anyone” possesses nonpublic information, but rather that a duty exists
only when there is a “relationship of trust and confidence between
parties to a transaction.”34 Thus, as a “markup man” for a financial
printer hired to print documents regarding a takeover bid, Chiarella did
24.
25.
26.

15 U.S.C. § 78j.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
United States v. Whitman, 904 F. Supp. 2d 363, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (Rakoff,
J.) (remarking on “the topsy-turvy way the law of insider trading has developed in the
courts”), aff’d, 555 F. App’x 98 (2d Cir. 2014).
27. See Cady, Roberts & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 6668, 1961 WL 60638, at
*3–4 (Nov. 8, 1961).
28. See SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473–74 (1977).
32. The classical theory focuses on the duty of the corporate insider to either fully
disclose or else abstain from trading on nonpublic information. See Michael P. Kenny
& Teresa D. Thebaut, Misguided Statutory Construction to Cover the Corporate
Universe: The Misappropriation Theory of Section 10(b), 59 ALB. L. REV. 139, 181
(1995).
33. See generally Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1981).
34. Id. at 230, 235.
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not have any relationship of trust and confidence to the target companies
whose stocks he traded, and was therefore not liable.35
Years later, the Supreme Court adopted “misappropriation theory”
as a complement to the classical theory.36 Rather than focusing on the
insider’s relationship to the issuer of the securities, misappropriation
theory premises liability on a “breach of duty owed to the source of the
information.”37 In United States v. O’Hagan, a partner at a law firm
representing the acquiring company in a tender offer purchased
securities in the target company.38 The Supreme Court found O’Hagan
liable because he breached a duty owed to his law firm.39 While under
Chiarella, O’Hagan would only have been prohibited from trading
securities of the acquiring company (the entity to which he owed a
relationship of trust and confidence), under the misappropriation theory,
O’Hagan was prohibited from trading securities of both the acquiring
and target companies unless he disclosed his trades to the source of the
information—his law firm.40
B. TIPPER-TIPPEE LIABILITY
Both the classical and misappropriation theories prohibit an insider
from trading on her own account, or from tipping another who then
trades on this information.41 A tippee derives a duty to disclose or
abstain from the insider-tipper.42 However, a tippee is not prohibited
from trading anytime they receive nonpublic information from the
tipper.43 Instead, the tipper must have benefitted, directly or indirectly,
from disclosing the information to the tippee.44 Without a personal gain
to the insider-tipper, “there has been no breach of duty to stockholders”
and correspondingly, “there is no derivative breach” by the tippee.45

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

See id. at 224, 233–34.
See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652–53 (1997).
Id. at 652 (emphasis added).
Id. at 647.
Id. at 653, 660.
Id. at 651–52.
See SEC v. Obus, 693 F.3d 276, 285–86 (2d Cir. 2012). This Note will refer to
this concept as “tipper-tippee liability.”
42. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 659 (1983).
43. See id. at 654–55.
44. Id. at 662.
45. Id.
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This “personal benefit” requirement is satisfied if the tipper
receives a “pecuniary gain or reputational benefit that will translate into
future earnings.”46 Circumstances that may lead to an inference of this
benefit include, “a relationship between the insider and the recipient that
suggests a quid pro quo from the latter, or an intention to benefit the
particular recipient.”47 Additionally, a benefit may be inferred “when an
insider makes a gift of confidential information to a trading relative or
friend” and “[t]he tip and trade resemble trading by the insider himself
followed by a gift of the profits to the recipient,” also known as gift
theory.48 In sum, the tippee inherits a fiduciary duty to shareholders not
to trade only when the insider has breached his duty by disclosing the
information (for a personal benefit), and the tippee knows (or should
know) that there has been a breach.49
Both the personal benefit requirement and the tippee knowledge
requirement were further explained in United States v. Newman.50 The
tippee must know not only that the “insider disclosed confidential
information,” but also “that he did so in exchange for a personal
benefit.”51 Further, the court narrowed the ability to establish a personal
benefit under gift theory.52 After Newman, this sort of personal benefit
required a “meaningfully close personal relationship that generates an
exchange that is objective, consequential, and represents at least a
potential gain of a pecuniary or similarly valuable nature.”53 The
Supreme Court later abrogated this portion of Newman in Salman v.
United States.54 However, the Supreme Court noted that the Salman
opinion did not affect the other holdings in Newman, particularly the
requirement that tippees know “the information they traded on came
from insiders or that the insiders received a personal benefit in exchange
for the tips.”55

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 654, 663.
Id. at 664.
Id.
See id. at 660.
773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014).
Id. at 442.
See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664.
Newman, 773 F.3d at 452.
137 S. Ct. 420, 428 (2016).
Id. at 425 n.1.
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The most recent landmark case in insider trading jurisprudence is
United States v. Martoma.56 In affirming the conviction of Martoma, the
Second Circuit found that a quid pro quo existed between Martoma and
the insider, Dr. Gilman, based on consulting agreements.57 Additionally,
Martoma modified gift theory by suggesting that a personal benefit
could include a stand-alone intention to benefit another, even without
any preexisting relationship.58 This is a new development in insider
trading jurisprudence, as prior cases all agreed there must be some sort
of relationship to establish a personal benefit under gift theory.59
C. THE INSIDER TRADING PROHIBITION ACT
On December 9, 2019, the House of Representatives passed the
Insider Trading Prohibition Act.60 The Act codifies certain aspects of
existing law, but also expands potential insider trading liability.61 Most
notably, the bill shifts the focus from fraud and deception to whether
information was obtained “wrongfully.”62
The ITPA prohibits the purchase or sale of securities while a person
is aware of material nonpublic information, if the person “knows, or
recklessly disregards, that such information has been obtained
56. 894 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2017). There were two Martoma opinions published by
the Second Circuit. See generally id.; 869 F.3d 58 (2d Cir. 2017); see also Donald C.
Langevoort, Watching Insider Trading Law Wobble: Obus, Newman, Salman, Two
Martomas, and a Blaszczak, GEORGETOWN LAW FACULTY PUBLICATIONS AND OTHER
WORKS 5 (2019), https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/2209 [https://perma.cc
/YN8G-RLBM]. The second, superseding opinion is the one discussed here.
57. See Martoma, 894 F.3d at 68–69, 71.
58. See id. at 74–75 (“The comma separating the ‘intention to benefit’ and
‘relationship . . . suggesting a quid pro quo’ phrases can be read to sever any connection
between them.”).
59. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 664 (1983) (explaining there can be a breach
of fiduciary duty if an insider “makes a gift of confidential information to a trading
relative or friend”); Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 427 (affirming the gift-giving standard set in
Dirks that a “gift of confidential information to ‘a trading relative’” constitutes a
personal benefit); United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 452 (2d Cir. 2014), (“To the
extent Dirks suggests that a personal benefit may be inferred from a personal
relationship between the tipper and tippee, where the tippee’s trades ‘resemble trading
by the insider himself followed by a gift of the profits to the recipient’ . . . we hold that
such an inference is impermissible in the absence of proof of a meaningfully close
personal relationship”), abrogated by Salman, 137 S. Ct. 420.
60. Insider Trading Prohibition Act, H.R. 2534, 116th Cong. (2019).
61. Id.
62. See id.; BHARARA ET AL., supra note 18, at 12.
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wrongfully, or that such purchase or sale would constitute a wrongful
use of such information.”63 “Wrongful” has many possible definitions
within the Act, including if the information was “obtained by” or
“would constitute”:
(A) theft, bribery, misrepresentation, or espionage . . . (B) a violation
of any Federal law protecting computer data or the intellectual
property or privacy of computer users; (C) conversion,
misappropriation, or other unauthorized and deceptive taking of such
information; or (D) a breach of any fiduciary duty, a breach of a
confidentiality agreement, a breach of contract, a breach of any code
of conduct or ethics policy, or a breach of any other personal or other
relationship of trust and confidence for a direct or indirect personal
benefit (including pecuniary gain, reputational benefit, or a gift of
confidential information to a trading relative or friend).64

The Act also makes clear that it is not necessary that the person
trading knows how the information was obtained, or that the person
trading knows whether a someone in the chain of communication
received a personal benefit, so long as the trader “was aware,
consciously avoided being aware, or recklessly disregarded that such
information was wrongfully obtained, improperly used, or wrongfully
communicated.”65
Thus, the Act codifies certain aspects of existing case law.66 For
example, the definition of “wrongful” includes a breach of fiduciary
duty or any other breach of trust and confidence for a personal benefit.67
Further, prohibiting trading while “aware” of information parallels the
“knowing possession” standard used in the Second Circuit and Rule
10b5-1(b).68
However, the bill also would make numerous changes to existing
law.69 For example, a clear prohibition on computer hacking is new to
63.
64.
65.
66.

H.R. 2534, 116th Cong. (2019).
Id.
Id.
See Jonathan E. Richman & Joshua M. Newville, House Passes Proposed
Legislation Defining Insider Trading, NAT’L L. REV. (Dec. 12, 2019),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/house-passes-proposed-legislation-defininginsider-trading [https://perma.cc/8BT2-RTFM].
67. H.R. 2534, 116th Cong. (2019).
68. See Richman & Newville, supra note 66.
69. See H.R. 2534, 116th Cong. (2019); Richman, supra note 66; Stephen L.
Ascher, Charles D. Riely & Melissa T. Fedornak, H.R. 2534 Insider Trading
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insider trading law.70 Additionally, the ITPA eliminates the Newman
requirement that a tippee know of the tipper’s personal benefit.71
Further, it must be “reasonably foreseeable” to the tipper that the tippee
will trade on the information given, which aims to protect disclosure to
those who would not use the information for securities trading, such as
journalists.72 Moreover, the Act insulates a fund manager in a situation
of employee misconduct if the manager was not involved.73
II. COMPARING TIPPER-TIPPEE LIABILITY AND THE ITPA
A. GAPS REMAINING AFTER MARTOMA, SALMAN, AND NEWMAN
After Newman, prosecuting tipper-tippee insider trading became
significantly more difficult.74 This was especially so in cases of
“remote” tipping (as opposed to direct tipper-tippee liability).75 The
Government must prove that the insider-tipper disclosed confidential
information for a personal benefit, and that the tippee knew of this
breach, including the tipper’s personal benefit.76 The facts of Newman
itself illustrate the gaps this standard creates.77
Prohibition Act Passes House, LEXOLOGY (Dec. 13, 2019), https://www.lexology.com/
library/detail.aspx?g=65be634b-9aaa-433e-b520-21267826e9ff
[https://perma.cc/HVE5-XYUY].
70. See Ascher et al., supra note 69 (explaining that although the government has
brought cases where insiders obtained information through hacking, these cases do not
necessarily “fit neatly” within current insider trading jurisprudence and the Second
Circuit has even suggested not all forms of computer hacking violated the anti-fraud
statute).
71. See H.R. 2534, 116th Cong. (2019); United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438,
442 (2d Cir. 2014).
72. H.R. 2534, 116th Cong. (2019); see also Ascher et al., supra note 69.
73. H.R. 2534, 116th Cong. (2019) (“Except as provided in section 20(a), no
person shall be liable . . . solely by reason of the fact that such person controls or
employs a person who has violated this section, if such controlling person or employer
did not participate in, or directly or indirectly induce the acts constituting the violation
of this section.”); see also Richman & Newville, supra note 66 (“This provision could
provide protection to a fund manager whose employee has gone rogue, as long as the
employer itself did not participate in or induce the alleged misconduct.”).
74. See Maria Babajanian, Note, Rewarded for Being Remote: How United States
v. Newman Improperly Narrows Liability for Tippees, 46 STETSON L. REV. 199, 201
(2016).
75. See id. at 201, 202 n.20.
76. See Newman, 773 F.3d at 442, abrogated by Salman v. United States, 137
S. Ct. 420 (2016). Although Dirks explains that the tippee is liable if he knew or should
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In Newman, several financial analysts at hedge funds and
investment firms shared information tipped from company insiders of
Dell and NVIDIA.78 The analysts exchanged these companies’ earnings
numbers before they were publicly released.79 However, the Second
Circuit reversed the judgment of the lower court and vacated the
convictions against Newman, a portfolio manager at Diamondback
Capital Management, and Chiasson, a portfolio manager at Level Global
Investors.80 Because Newman and Chiasson were three and four levels
removed from the insider, the Government failed to prove that they
knew of the benefit the insider-tipper received from exchanging this
information.81
However, this ruling is problematic considering that Newman and
Chiasson were sophisticated investors and portfolio managers at billiondollar hedge funds.82 They knew Dell’s and NVIDIA’s public earnings
announcements were forthcoming in May 2008.83 Although one could
plausibly argue that Newman and Chiasson did not know the
information was traded on a nonpublic basis,84 this seems highly
unlikely.85 Plainly, a sophisticated investor knows that the receipt of a
have known of a breach by the tipper, the case is silent on whether the tipper must
know specifically of the tipper’s personal benefit. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 660
(1983). However, Newman concludes “the answer follows naturally from Dirks.”
773 F.3d at 447.
77. See id. at 442–44.
78. See id.
79. Id. at 443.
80. Id. at 442–43, 455.
81. See id. at 443, 448, 455.
82. See Amanda Cantrell, Diamondback Founders Return With Billion-Dollar
Hedge Fund, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR (Sept. 17, 2019), https://www.institutional
investor.com/article/b1h6d9xw5dwdxj/Diamondback-Founders-Return-With-BillionDollar-Hedge-Fund [https://perma.cc/2ZNY-J45P]; Daniel Fisher, Former Level Global
Counsel Says Insider-Trading Decision Didn’t Clarify Much, FORBES (Dec. 10, 2016,
7:51 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2016/12/10/former-level-globalcounsel-says-insider-trading-decision-didnt-clarify-much/#5beb2553154b
[https://perma.cc/UP6P-ZDVS].
83. Newman, 773 F.3d at 443.
84. See Tebsy Paul, Friends with Benefits: Analyzing the Implications of United
States v. Newman for the Future of Insider Trading, 5 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 109, 126
(2015).
85. See Bruce Dorris, If the Supreme Court Won’t Help Stop Insider Trading, Who
Will?, FRAUD MAGAZINE (Oct. 2015), https://www.fraud-magazine.com/article
.aspx?id=4294990341 [https://perma.cc/4SLV-NXYZ].
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company’s earnings numbers before they are publicly announced
constitutes material nonpublic information.86 Further, a number of courts
have said that “it can be reckless to ignore the likelihood that multiple
accurate tips were somehow the product of innocence.”87 In sum,
Newman and Chiasson could not have been unaware that they were
trading on inside information, which was the Government’s exact
argument in Newman.88 Essentially, “as sophisticated traders, they must
have known that information was disclosed by insiders in breach of a
fiduciary duty, and not for any legitimate corporate purpose.”89 Yet, the
Second Circuit vacated their convictions and ordered their indictments
be dismissed.90
Aside from this major flaw, other gaps remain after Newman.91 For
example, the court used the phrase “should have known” at some points
in the opinion, but at others simply focused on actual knowledge.92 The
court even discussed that there was insufficient evidence to establish
that Newman and Chiasson “knew, or deliberately avoided knowing” the
information came from insiders.93 These suggestions of lower standards
of scienter conflict with the conclusion of the court that “a tippee’s
knowledge of the insider’s breach necessarily requires knowledge that
the insider disclosed confidential information in exchange for personal
benefit.”94 Thus, the actual holding of Newman ignores the “should
know” language in Dirks.95
Further, Newman suggests that in other circumstances a tippee’s
knowledge of the tip’s source could be inferred, such as when a tip is

86.
87.

See id.
Langevoort, supra note 56, at 41–42 (“[T]he leaks were high quality and
repeated, suggesting deliberateness from within the companies.”).
88. See Newman, 773 F.3d at 443–44.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 455.
91. See Langevoort, supra note 56, at 38–39.
92. Newman, 773 F.3d at 455 (stating that the facts at hand did not support the
Government’s inference that “defendants knew, or should have known, that the
information originated with a corporate insider” (emphasis added)).
93. Id. (emphasis added).
94. Id. at 449. For example, there is no suggestion in the court’s actual holding that
anything less than actual knowledge (such as “reckless disregard”) would suffice to
establish liability. See id.
95. Langevoort, supra note 56, at 38–39 (noting that although at points in the
opinion, the Newman court quotes the language in Dirks, it is never actually addressed).
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“sufficiently detailed and proprietary.”96 There could also be tips that are
so “overwhelmingly suspicious” that a tippee must “[know] or
consciously [avoid] knowing” this information stemmed from an insider
receiving a personal benefit.97 However, the court found that the tips did
not rise to that level of suspicion in Newman.98 This conclusion is
problematic, because if Newman is not an example of “suspicious”
information that could be inferred to be from an inside source, it is
difficult to imagine what is.99
These gaps remain even after Salman and Martoma. In Salman, the
Supreme Court abrogated part of Newman’s holding related to gift
theory and what exactly is considered a personal benefit.100 However,
the tippee’s knowledge was not an issue in Salman, as the tipping
involved family members.101 Salman was involved in a tipping scheme
with his brother-in-law, Maher Kara, and Maher’s brother, Michael
Kara.102 Salman learned from Michael that the source of the information
exchange was Maher.103
The tippee’s knowledge was also not an issue in Martoma, as that
case dealt with direct tipper-tippee liability.104 However, the Second
Circuit reaffirmed Newman’s holding that a tippee must be aware that

96. Newman, 773 F.3d at 455 (“[I]n this case, where the financial information is of
a nature regularly and accurately predicted by analyst modeling, and the tippees are
several levels removed from the source, the inference that defendants knew, or should
have known, that the information originated with a corporate insider is unwarranted.”).
However, even if that were so, it would not, without more, “permit an inference as to
that source’s improper motive for disclosure.” Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. See Langevoort, supra note 56, at 41 (“[T]he leaks were high quality and
repeated, suggesting deliberateness from within the companies.”).
100. Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 423–24, 428 (2016) (“To the extent
the Second Circuit held that the tipper must also receive something of a ‘pecuniary or
similarly valuable nature’ in exchange for a gift to family or friends . . . we agree with
the Ninth Circuit that this requirement is inconsistent with Dirks.” (citation omitted)).
101. Id. at 427–28.
102. Id. at 423–24.
103. Id. at 425.
104. United States v. Martoma, 894 F.3d 64, 76 (2d Cir. 2017) (“We observe that,
unlike the defendants in Newman, Martoma received confidential information directly
from the tipper, and he does not claim that he was unaware of any personal benefit Dr.
Gilman received.”).
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the tipper breached a fiduciary duty and that the tipper received a
personal benefit in doing so.105
1. Rationales
Newman emphasizes capital market efficiency and incentivizing
investors to seek an informational advantage.106 The court explicitly
states that “nothing in the law requires a symmetry of information in the
nation’s securities markets.”107 The holding is rooted in precedent, such
as Chiarella, which rejected any notion that equal access to information
for all was required under federal securities laws.108 To be sure, since
Chiarella, the Supreme Court has never adopted an approach to insider
trading that embraced complete information parity.109 Newman reasons
that requiring a tippee to know of the tipper’s benefit strikes the proper
balance between protecting a “corporation’s interest in confidentiality”
and “promoting efficiency in the nation’s securities markets.”110
Dirks invoked many of the same rationales.111 The facts of Dirks
illustrate exactly why courts have deliberately chosen to limit the
possible breadth of insider trading liability.112 There, Dirks was an
officer of a broker-dealer firm that provided investment analysis of
insurance company securities to institutional investors.113 He received a
tip from Ronald Secrist, a former officer of Equity Funding of America,
alleging there were fraudulent practices within the company that led to
overstatement of the company’s assets.114 In response, Dirks visited
105.
106.

Id. (“The Court persuasively explained that both were required.”).
See United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 449 (2d Cir. 2014):
The policy rationale [for prohibiting insider trading] stops well short of prohibiting
all trading on material nonpublic information. Efficient capital markets depend on
the protection of property rights in information. However, they also require that
persons who acquire and act on information about companies be able to profit
from the information they generate . . . .

Id. (quoting United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 578 (2d Cir. 1991) (Winter, J.,
concurring)).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. See Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 423 (2016). But cf. 17 C.F.R. §
240.14e-3 (embracing equal access theory in the context of insider trading regarding
tender offers).
110. Newman, 773 F.3d at 449.
111. See generally Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
112. Id. at 648–49.
113. Id. at 648.
114. Id. at 649.
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Equity Funding’s headquarters, interviewed several of its officers and
employees, and confirmed charges of fraud from certain employees
(although not from senior management).115 Dirks and his firm did not
own any Equity Funding stock, but Dirks openly discussed his findings
with many clients and investors–some of whom subsequently sold their
holdings in Equity Funding.116 Dirks even urged the Wall Street Journal
to write a story on the fraud allegations, but the newspaper refused.117
During the two weeks Dirks conducted this investigation, Equity
Funding’s stock price fell dramatically, which eventually forced the
New York Stock Exchange to halt trading.118
The SEC brought an investigation against Dirks.119 The Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ruled against him.120
However, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that a breach only
occurs when the insider-tipper receives a personal benefit.121 Here,
Secrist received no personal benefit—he did not obtain any monetary
compensation for his tips, nor was his purpose to make a “gift” to
Dirks.122 To the contrary, Secrist was motivated by a desire to expose
the fraud occurring at Equity Funding.123 Thus, without a breach by
Secrist, there was no derivative breach by Dirks.124
A key part of the Dirks holding was the importance of investment
analysts in securities markets. Dirks himself played a crucial role in
exposing Equity Funding’s fraud, which had avoided the scrutiny of
regulators and other public sources of information.125 This efficient
market justification is emphasized throughout the Court’s opinion.126 For
example, the Court reasons that a broader rule could have an “inhibiting
influence on the role of market analysts” who often “ferret out and
115.
116.
117.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 649–50 (explaining that the newspaper refused to publish due to libel
concerns).
118. Id. at 650.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 651–52.
121. Id. at 663.
122. Id. at 666–67.
123. Id. at 667.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 649, 651–52 (noting that the SEC even recognized Dirks’ important role
“in bringing [Equity Funding’s] massive fraud to light,” and thus only censured him as
a result of the investigation).
126. Id. at 649–52, 658–59.
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analyze information” by meeting and questioning corporate insiders.127
The nature of the information analysts receive in these circumstances
“cannot be made simultaneously available to all of the corporation’s
stockholders or the public generally.”128
In sum, the rationale behind both Newman and Dirks is that it
would be detrimental to the market if legitimate searches for information
were “chilled by the threat of liability.”129 Indeed, the “constant informal
communication process between the issuer and competing individual
analysts has . . . been recognized as an important contribution to
marketplace efficiency[,]”130 which remains the case even after the SEC
adopted Regulation Fair Disclosure (“Reg FD”).131 Although one could
argue that given the “semi-strong” form of the efficient market
hypothesis, insider trading prohibitions should not affect market
efficiency,132 it is not always easy to separate “public” and “nonpublic”
information into distinguishable, “black-and-white,” categories.133 In

127.
128.
129.
130.

Id. at 658.
Id. at 659.
See Langevoort, supra note 56, at 30.
COX ET AL., supra note 14, at 892 (citing Daniel R. Fischel, Insider Trading
and Investment Analysts: An Economic Analysis of Dirks v. Securities and Exchange
Commission, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 127 (1984)). Some have even argued insider trading
regulation is “both unnecessary and counterproductive in that it frustrates prompt price
adjustment to new private information.” Id. at 868.
131. Id. at 893; see also John L. Campbell, Brady J. Twedt, & Benjamin C.
Whipple, Did Regulation FD Prevent Selective Disclosure?, THE CLS BLUE SKY BLOG
(Jul. 18, 2016), https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2016/07/18/did-regulation-fdprevent-selective-disclosure/ [https://perma.cc/Z4CD-TWPS]
(“[A]nalysts
and
institutional investors were concerned that an unintended consequence of [Reg FD]
would be firms reducing their overall disclosure levels, ultimately resulting in less
efficient markets.”). In 2000, the SEC passed Reg FD to prevent issuers from
selectively disclosing material information. See COX ET AL., supra note 14, at 893. It
mandates insiders who have disclosed private information to share that same
information publicly (or abstain from disclosing the private information in the first
instance). See 17 C.F.R. §§ 243.100–243.103. However, the efficacy of Reg FD is
questionable. See, e.g., Campbell, supra.
132. See COX ET AL., supra note 14, at 88. In its “semi-strong” form, the efficient
capital market hypothesis states that security prices reflect all publicly available
information. Id.
133. Matt Levine, Justices Will Know Insider Trading When They See It,
BLOOMBERG OPINION (Jan. 19, 2016, 5:48 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/
articles/2016-01-19/justices-will-know-insider-trading-when-they-see-it
[https://perma.cc/AMK5-89B7].
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fact, it is more often the case that the information analysts are seeking is
a shade of gray.134
For example, “public” information is typically that which is
reasonably accessible to all investors.135 It might seem obvious to say
that newspaper articles are “public,” and that the unpublished results of
a new drug’s clinical trial are “nonpublic.”136 However, there is a vast
amount of information that falls in between these opposite ends of the
spectrum.137 Is observing employees entering and leaving a factory from
a public parking lot material nonpublic information? What about flying
a drone over an industrial plant? What about a securities analyst hearing
from an investor-relations person, “Yeah, things are trending a little
lower than we thought . . .”?138 Essentially, the concern is that strictly
enforcing insider trading will make it harder for investment analysts to
do their jobs and have a chilling effect on this sort of “gray”139
information that drives the efficiency of markets.140 Without limitations
such as those imposed in Chiarella and Dirks, analysts would be left
hoping that the SEC’s prosecutorial discretion will weigh in their
favor.141
2. Critiques
The bottom line after Newman is that some people who have traded
on material nonpublic information will simply be permitted to do so—as
Newman itself illustrates, it is now incredibly difficult for the

134. See SHEELAH KOLHATKAR, BLACK EDGE 105-06 (2017) (describing public
information as a “white edge,” obviously nonpublic and illegal information as “black
edge,” and the trickier information in between as “grey edge”).
135. COX ET AL., supra note 14, at 872–73.
136. United States v. Martoma, 894 F.3d 64, 69 (2d Cir. 2017).
137. See KOLHATKAR, supra note 134, at xviii–xix.
138. Id. at 106.
139. Id. at 105–06.
140. See Langevoort, supra note 56, at 30–32; see also Levine, supra note 134
(explaining that an open exchange of information between shareholders and managers
should be encouraged as this makes security prices more accurate and markets more
efficient).
141. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 664 n.24 (1983) (“Without legal limitations,
market participants are forced to rely on the reasonableness of the SEC’s litigation
strategy, but that can be hazardous, as the facts of this case make plain.”).
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Government to prosecute remote tippees.142 It is hard to prove that the
tippee knew of the tipper’s personal benefit when there is a long chain
of tippees removed from the initial disclosure of inside information.143
One could even go as far as to say that Newman allows insider trading in
these long tipper-tippee chains.144
Preet Bharara, former United States Attorney for the Southern
District of New York, described Newman as “essentially legalizing the
don’t-ask-don’t-tell information gathering model” and granting
“permission to trade on material nonpublic information, as long as you
don’t know too much about where it came from.”145 This especially
manifests in large, decentralized hedge funds such as those involved in
Newman and Martoma.146 Indeed, it seems very unlikely that the
manager of a hedge fund with a decentralized, separately managed, and
competitive structure could ever be found guilty of insider trading.147
Martoma itself illustrates this difficulty.148
Matthew Martoma managed a portfolio at S.A.C. Capital Advisors
(“SAC Capital”), focused on pharmaceutical and healthcare
companies.149 With the help of expert networking firms, Martoma
consulted with doctors working on an Alzheimer’s drug clinical trial for
two pharmaceutical companies, Elan and Wyeth.150 Dr. Sidney Gilman,
chair of the safety monitoring committee for the clinical trial, told
Martoma the unsuccessful results of the trial before they were published;
SAC Capital subsequently reduced its position in Elan and Wyeth, and
entered into short-sales and option trades.151 Martoma was indeed
convicted of insider trading, but his relations with Dr. Gilman could be
described as direct tipper-tippee liability.152 On the other hand, federal
142. Sara Almousa, Comment, Friends with Benefits? Clarifying the Role
Relationships Play in Satisfying the Personal Benefit Requirement Under Tipper-Tippee
Liability, 23 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1251, 1276 (2016); Jessica Hostert, Note, Great
Expectations, Good Intentions, and the Appearance of the Personal Benefit in Insider
Trading: Why the Stage Needs Reset After Martoma, 43 S. ILL. UNIV. L.J. 703, 717
(2019).
143. Langevoort, supra note 56, at 37.
144. See id.
145. KOLHATKAR, supra note 134, at 291–92.
146. Levine, supra note 133.
147. Id.
148. See generally United States v. Martoma, 894 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2017).
149. Id. at 68–69.
150. Id. at 69.
151. Id. at 69–70.
152. Id. at 76.
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prosecutors had pursued Steven Cohen, manager of SAC Capital, for
almost a decade.153 In addition to difficulties “flipping” witnesses to gain
evidence against Cohen, after the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari
in Newman, the chances of prosecutors convicting Cohen severely
diminished.154
Although the “market efficiency story”155 might be true, when a
large player like SAC Capital sells its holdings in Elan and Wyeth and
shorts 4.5 million shares of Elan, earning roughly $80.3 million in gains
and $194.5 million in averted losses, investors lose confidence in the
market.156 This is especially so when Martoma subsequently receives a
$9 million bonus from SAC Capital.157 This loss in confidence
discourages investment not only from retail investors, but also other
investment analysts.158 Ultimately, despite the arguments in support of
market efficiency, the fundamental unfairness of this sort of conduct has
led the SEC to continue to emphasize the need for regulation.159
Further, a flaw in this “market efficiency” argument can also be
seen in Dirks itself. As the dissent points out, if Dirks and Secrist
wanted the market to be aware of the fraud occurring at Equity Funding,
they could have reported this information to the SEC.160 Eventually,
Dirks did meet with the SEC’s Deputy Director of Enforcement, but
only after his clients had “unloaded close to $15 million of Equity
Funding stock” before the price plummeted.”161 Dirks’ clients essentially
“shift[ed] the losses that were inevitable due to the Equity Funding fraud
from themselves to uninformed market participants.”162 Thus, even in a
“beneficial” situation such as Dirks, where the insider exposed a
massive fraud occurring in the company, shareholders still suffered from
153.
154.

See KOLHATKAR, supra note 134, at 281.
Id. at 282, 291 (“[The Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari] was yet another
measure of vindication for Cohen . . . .”). The structure of SAC Capital “was organized
to insulate Cohen from the behavior of lower-level traders and analysts.” Id. at 143.
155. See supra Section II.A.1.
156. See Martoma, 894 F.3d at 70; see also KOLHATKAR, supra note 134, at 117;
Babajanian, supra note 74, at 199.
157. See Martoma, 894 F.3d at 70 (2d Cir. 2017).
158. See KOLHATKAR, supra note 134, at 153 (explaining that the SEC received a
referral letter about SAC Capital’s suspicious trades from a trader at RBC Capital
Markets).
159. Spacone, supra note 12, at 11.
160. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 668–69 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
161. Id. at 670.
162. Id.
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Secrist, their fiduciary, exposing inside information.163 Justice Blackmun
criticizes the majority as justifying the misconduct “because the general
benefit derived from the violation of Secrist’s duty to shareholders
outweighed the harm caused to those shareholders.”164 In sum, although
Dirks did expose a massive fraud, at the end of the day his clients
profited while the rest of the market suffered losses.165
B. THE ITPA SEEKS TO CLOSE THOSE GAPS
The ITPA attempts to expand tipper-tippee liability in a few
ways.166 First, the Act prohibits a person from tipping if it is “reasonably
foreseeable” that the tippee will trade based on the tip.167 Additionally, it
seeks to restrain tipping chains by prohibiting an initial tippee from
passing it on to a second tippee who then trades.168
Most notably, the ITPA eliminates the tippee knowledge
requirement of Newman.169 It prohibits trading while aware of material
nonpublic information if the trader “knows, or recklessly disregards, that
such information has been obtained wrongfully, or that such purchase or
sale would constitute a wrongful use of such information.”170 The Act
explicitly states:
It shall not be necessary that the person trading while aware of such
information . . . knows the specific means by which the information
was obtained or communicated, or whether any personal benefit was
paid or promised by or to any person in the chain of communication,
so long as the person trading while aware of such information or
making the communication . . . was aware, consciously avoided
being aware, or recklessly disregarded that such information was
wrongfully
obtained,
improperly
used,
or
wrongfully
communicated.171

Thus, the focus shifts from whether the tippee knew of the personal
benefit the tipper received to whether the tippee knew the information

163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id. at 672–73.
Id. at 676–77.
Id.
H.R. 2534, 116th Cong. (2019).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
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itself was obtained wrongfully.172 This “make[s] it easier for prosecutors
to establish that a trader knew what he was doing was wrong.”173
Thus, if Newman were to take place after the enactment of the
ITPA, it would no longer be necessary that Newman and Chiasson knew
of the personal benefit received by the original tipper, which was nearly
impossible as Newman and Chiasson were three and four levels
removed from the original tipper.174 The focus would instead be whether
Newman and Chiasson were aware, consciously avoided being aware, or
recklessly disregarded that the information they traded on was
“wrongful.”175
Similarly, consider a scenario where a junior investment banker,
Maria, wishes to transition into the hedge fund business.176 She
approaches a hedge fund manager at a party and slips a note with a tip
about one of her upcoming deals in the manager’s pocket, with a
“you’re welcome,” her name, and e-mail address.177 If the hedge fund
manager trades on this information, it would likely be considered in
“reckless disregard” for the wrongfulness of the information.178 In
contrast, under current insider trading law, it would be easier to craft a
defense that the hedge fund manager did not know whether there was a
breach or whether Maria received any personal benefit.
However, under both these scenarios, the insider-tipper must still
receive a personal benefit. The difference between the ITPA and current
insider trading law is that under the ITPA, the tippee need not know of
this personal benefit.179
1. Rationales
Many have urged Congress to codify insider trading in legislation
for some time.180 Indeed, insider trading case law has been described as
a “garden maze of doctrine that has too many circles and dead ends,”
172.
173.
174.

Id.
Roberts, supra note 19.
H.R. 2534, 116th Cong. (2019); United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 443
(2d Cir. 2014).
175. H.R. 2534, 116th Cong. (2019).
176. COX ET AL., supra note 14, at 892.
177. Id.
178. H.R. 2534, 116th Cong. (2019).
179. Id.
180. BHARARA ET AL., supra note 18, at 14.
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possessing “unnecessary complications,” and overall, “wobbling.”181
Creating judge-made law based on Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is
flawed in itself, as Rule 10b-5 is meant to regulate fraud, which is
attenuated from the act of insider trading.182 Further, given that insider
trading can impose criminal penalties, legislation can provide notice and
due process in a way that judge-made law cannot, especially after the
confusion created by many recent cases.183
Shifting the focus of the inquiry to whether the information was
obtained “wrongfully” adds clarity, while also expanding the scope of
insider trading liability.184 The ITPA focuses on the nature of the
information itself and how it was obtained, rather than the tippee’s
knowledge of the tipper’s personal benefit.185 Thus, the ITPA curtails
trading on information obtained in long chains of tippees that is
permitted under existing insider trading law.186 Under such a framework,
portfolio managers of decentralized hedge funds cannot simply put
many layers of analysts in between the investor and ultimate trader to
avoid liability.187 To the contrary, the ITPA prohibits turning a blind eye
or purposely ignoring the source of the information.188
2. Critiques
On the other hand, many disagree that legislation is the proper way
to regulate insider trading. Common law does have some advantages,
such as allowing judges to tailor holdings to the specific facts of the
case.189 Further, many believe that a clear statute in the insider trading
context just provides “a roadmap for fraud” for sophisticated market

181.
182.

Langevoort, supra note 56, at 5, 50.
COX ET AL., supra note 14, at 868 (explaining that part of the conceptual
difficulty of insider trading law stems from the conflict that exists between its “broad
fairness-based aim” and “the narrower statutory mechanism that must be used to
combat it”).
183. Langevoort, supra note 56, at 2, 7.
184. See supra Section II.A.2.; BHARARA ET AL., supra note 18, at 14.
185. Ascher et al., supra note 69.
186. H.R. 2534, 116th Cong. (2019).
187. See supra Section II.A.2.
188. See H.R. 2534, 116th Cong. (2019).
189. Jill E. Fisch, Constructive Ambiguity and Judicial Development of Insider
Trading, 71 SMU L. REV. 749, 758 (2018).
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actors to evade liability.190 Legislation deprives the Government of the
flexibility to prosecute new, creative insider trading misconduct.191
Additionally, the Act did not eliminate the personal benefit
requirement altogether.192 Many argue that this requirement should be
removed as it causes confusion, uncertainty, and incongruent results.193
Worst of all, it permits insider trading even when there was an apparent
breach of a duty.194 In sum, it narrows the scope of insider trading
liability without proper justification.195 For example, as the REPORT OF
THE BHARARA TASK FORCE ON INSIDER TRADING explains, “the
requirement can create the misimpression in the market . . . that a pure
gift of material nonpublic information, without any expectation of
reciprocity, to someone who trades on that information might be
allowed.”196
The limiting nature of including this personal benefit approach can
be illustrated using an example. Imagine Jamie Dimon, CEO of J.P.
Morgan, taking the train home from work, and as he is rushing to get off
at his stop, leaves a binder with confidential information in his seat.
Another train passenger, picks up this binder, looks inside, and
subsequently trades on this information. Under existing case law and the
ITPA, there would be no liability—Dimon received no benefit by
forgetting his binder on the train. This is so even if it was apparent to the
passenger that this information is confidential. On the other hand, if the
ITPA removed the personal benefit requirement altogether, the train
passenger would be liable.197
Further, because of the Act’s narrow definition of personal benefit,
the ITPA would still not hold Newman or Chiasson, or even our
190. Id. at 760–61 (“If it is difficult to determine the precise behavior that will
subject a trader to insider trading liability, it will be more difficult for a trader who
would skirt the law to identify the precise limits on his or her behavior.”); see also Reed
Harasimowicz, Note, Nothing New, Man!—The Second Circuit’s Clarification of
Insider Trading Liability in United States v. Newman Comes at a Critical Juncture in
the Evolution of Insider Trading, 57 B.C. L. REV. 765, 791 (2016).
191. Harasimowicz, supra note 190, at 791–92.
192. H.R. 2534, 116th Cong. (2019).
193. See BHARARA ET AL., supra note 18, at 15–16.
194. Id. at 16.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. H.R. 2534, 116th Cong. (2019). This action would likely constitute a breach of
a code of conduct or ethics policy. Additionally, the hypothetical passenger at least
recklessly disregarded the possibility that the information was obtained wrongfully.
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ambitious investment banker, Maria, who slipped a tip to the hedge fund
manager, liable.198 In Newman, the benefit to the insider was one to
investor relations personnel, who wished to establish relationships with
firms and analysts that were in a position to buy their company’s
stock.199 The investor relations insider may give tips of good news in
hopes that when there is bad news, the analysts are less likely to sell, or
at least not as much as they would if they did not receive inside
information.200 This information exchange creates a benefit to the
investor relations personnel through traditional forms of compensation
such as a raise, promotion, or stock options.201 Although selective
disclosure of this kind is prohibited by Reg FD, it is not a recognized
personal benefit under current insider trading law.202 Thus, in spite of the
ITPA’s attempts to reverse Newman, Newman and Chiasson’s conduct
would still likely be permitted under the ITPA.203 Similarly, the benefit
Maria likely seeks is a job with the hedge fund manager.204 This
personal benefit is also not necessarily included under existing insider
trading jurisprudence, nor is it recognized in the ITPA.205
Further, the ITPA contains various unclear aspects of its own.206
Some have remarked that the bill would lead to more confusion and give
prosecutors too much discretion.207 The bill provides no guidance on
what “constitutes the necessary confidentiality agreement, contract, or
relationship of trust and confidence.”208 Further, although many are
pleased with the shift in focus to “wrongfulness,” this term has

198.
199.
200.

See supra Section II.B.
United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 453–55 (2d Cir. 2014).
See id. at 454–55 (describing investor relations personnel “routinely ‘leak[ing]’
earnings data in advance of quarterly earnings” in order to “establish relationships with
financial firms who might be in a position to buy Dell’s stock”).
201. See Martin Bengtzen, Private Investor Meetings in Public Firms: The Case for
Increasing Transparency, 22 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 33, 52–53 (2017) (explaining
firms hold private investor meetings for many “intangible” reasons such as “bond[ing]”
with investors, convincing them to buy stock, and generating liquidity).
202. COX ET AL., supra note 14, at 893.
203. H.R. 2534, 116th Cong. (2019).
204. COX ET AL., supra note 14, at 892.
205. See supra Section I.B.
206. See H.R. 2534, 116th Cong. (2019).
207. See Roberts, supra note 19 (“The bill would perplex investors, give prosecutors
too much discretion, and bedevil the courts.”).
208. Id.
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ambiguities of its own.209 Thus, the ITPA may not provide significantly
more clarity than current insider trading jurisprudence.210
Others have criticized the Act because it does not distinguish
between criminal and civil liability.211 The Act describes the relevant
mental state as being aware, consciously avoiding such awareness, or
recklessly disregarding the possibility of wrongfully obtained
information for all offenders.212 The Bharara Task Force suggests
making the intent requirements explicit in two ways.213 First, the state of
mind should be clearly defined as “willfulness” for criminal violations
and “recklessness” for civil violations.214 Second, in terms of the
tippee’s knowledge of the underlying breach, for criminal liability, the
tippee should know that the tipper obtained or communicated
information wrongfully, and for civil liability, the tippee should have at
least recklessly disregarded that fact.215
III. STATUTORY SOLUTIONS
A. THE ITPA OFFERS MANY ADVANTAGES OVER EXISTING INSIDER
TRADING JURISPRUDENCE
The ITPA offers many improvements to insider trading law that
should be implemented, including the sheer fact that it is legislation and
the elimination of the requirement that the tippee know of the tipper’s
personal benefit.
1. Legislation is Necessary
First, legislation is indeed necessary to clarify the confusing,
“topsy-turvy” jurisprudence that has developed in insider trading law.216
Thus, Congress should not abandon this attempt to codify insider trading

209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

Fisch, supra note 189, at 762.
See id.
BHARARA ET AL., supra note 18, at 17.
See H.R. 2534, 116th Cong. (2019); BHARARA ET AL., supra note 18, at 17.
See BHARARA ET AL., supra note 18, at 17.
Id.
See id.
See supra Section II.B.1.; United States v. Whitman, 904 F. Supp. 2d 363, 372
(S.D.N.Y. 2012), aff’d, 555 F. App’x 98 (2d Cir. 2014).
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jurisprudence as it has in the past.217 Despite some advantages to
common-law, the bottom line is that those who commit insider trading
can be subject to criminal liability.218 This presents a need to provide
notice on what activities will result in jail-time, and which will not.219
Especially after the confusing line of cases stemming from Newman to
Salman to Martoma, judge-made law has left significant gaps that would
be best filled by clear, well written legislation.220
2. Elimination of Newman’s Tippee Knowledge Requirement
Second, the ITPA properly no longer requires that the tippee know
of the personal benefit received by the tipper.221 In addition to being a
source of confusion, this requirement made it extremely difficult to
prosecute insider trading and encouraged a system of nonaccountability, ignorance, and purposeful shielding of liability.222
The difference the Act would make can be seen in a case such as
Martoma, and the difficulty law enforcement officials had in
prosecuting Cohen, the manager of SAC Capital.223 Under the ITPA,
Cohen would likely face liability as the information was wrongfully
obtained (Dr. Gilman breached a confidentiality agreement by
disclosing the results of the drug trial early to Martoma for a personal
benefit) and Cohen at least recklessly disregarded that fact (or more
likely, actually knew this was the case).224 Requiring knowledge of the
personal benefit received, on the other hand, makes this extremely
difficult.225 Holding Cohen accountable is a beneficial result, because he
was instilling a culture at SAC Capital where insider trading was
rampant.226

217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
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224.

See supra Section II.B.1.
See supra Section II.B.1.
See supra Section II.B.1.
See supra Section II.A.
H.R. 2534, 116th Cong. (2019).
See supra Section II.A.2.
See supra Section II.A.2.
See H.R. 2534, 116th Cong. (2019); see generally United States v. Martoma,
894 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2017).
225. See supra Section II.A.2.
226. KOLHATKAR, supra note 134, at 248, 250–51. Although the Act does contain a
provision meant to insulate fund managers, Cohen would still likely face liability.
Given the culture instilled at SAC Capital, one could argue he “indirectly induced the
acts constituting the violation of this section.” H.R. 2534, 116th Cong. (2019).
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B. WAYS TO IMPROVE THE ITPA
Despite the Act’s advantages, the ITPA has flaws of its own.
Enhancing clarity, differentiating between civil and criminal liability,
and broadening the definition of “personal benefit” are all improvements
that should be made before the bill becomes law.
1. Clarity
The ITPA has many sources of ambiguity and may indeed be more
confusing than current insider trading jurisprudence. The Senate should
add clarity in amending the bill.
Specifically, the “catchall provision” defining wrongfulness seems
to attempt to codify certain aspects of existing insider trading
jurisprudence, but leads to more questions than answers.227 The clause
defines one aspect of wrongfulness as “a breach of any other personal or
other relationship of trust and confidence for a direct or indirect personal
benefit (including pecuniary gain, reputational benefit, or a gift of
confidential information to a trading relative or friend).”228 Missing from
this phrase is the Dirks language that a personal benefit can be inferred
from “a relationship between the insider and the recipient that suggests a
quid pro quo from the latter, or an intention to benefit the particular
recipient.”229
The ITPA’s omission of this language could suggest the drafters
wished to overrule this way of proving a personal benefit, but it is
unclear from the current wording. Further, Martoma suggests that a
stand-alone intention to benefit is enough to satisfy this aspect230—
whether this is codified or overruled is also unclear. Moreover, in terms
of gift theory, the statute only includes the language “trading relative or
friend,” and not the requirement imposed in Newman and later affirmed
in Salman, that there must be a “close personal relationship” when
tipping a relative or friend.231 Again, the omission could suggest the
House is overruling this aspect of Newman, but it is unclear.
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H.R. 2534, 116th Cong. (2019).
Id.
Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 664 (1983).
See United States v. Martoma, 894 F.3d 64, 76 (2d Cir. 2017).
Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 425 (2016); United States v. Newman,
773 F.3d 438, 452 (2d Cir. 2014).
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Perhaps a solution to these many ambiguities is to amend the
“including” language to be “including, but not limited to.” However,
this may still be ambiguous as to whether it is codifying the abovementioned aspects of Dirks, Newman, and Martoma (for example, a
court may wonder why Congress chose to list certain aspects in the
phrase, but not others). Thus, the Act should explicitly state what
aspects from these holdings it is adopting or rejecting. For example,
including language that “[i]t shall not be necessary that the person
trading . . . [knows] whether any personal benefit was paid or promised
by or to any person in the chain of communication” explicitly overrules
aspects of Newman.232 Similar clarity should be added to other parts of
the statute.
Additionally, in defining “wrongfulness,” it seems “for a direct or
indirect personal benefit” modifies all the breaches mentioned in the rest
of the clause because commas are used rather than semicolons, which
would denote separation.233 However, given at least the Second Circuit’s
emphasis on commas,234 it would not be surprising for a court to
interpret these clauses as separate-for example, that “personal benefit”
only modifies a “breach of trust and confidence,” whereas “a breach of
contract” is wrongful in itself, without any personal benefit to the
tipper.235 This is something the Senate should consider and clarify.
2. Civil and Criminal Liability
The ITPA does not differentiate between civil and criminal
liability, and, as the Bharara Task Force argues, it should.236 In terms of
notice and due process, it should be clear what activities will send you to
jail, and those that will not.237 Market participants should not be left to
hope for reasonableness in prosecutors’ litigation strategies, but instead
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233.

H.R. 2534 , 116th Cong. (2019).
Id.; Raymond B. Marcin, Punctuation and the Interpretation of Statutes, 9
CONN. L. REV. 227, 237 (1977) (explaining that the use of semicolons operated to
separate clauses within a statute).
234. Martoma, 894 F.3d at 74 (“The commas separating the ‘intention to benefit’
and ‘relationship . . . suggesting a quid pro quo’ phrases can be read to sever any
connection between them.”).
235. H.R. 2534, 116th Cong. (2019).
236. Id.; BHARARA ET AL., supra note 18, at 17.
237. See supra Section II.B.1.
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should be able to know when their actions are criminal, and when their
actions will only be subject to civil liability.238
In differentiating between criminal and civil liability, the Act
should incorporate the suggestion of the Bharara Task Force that the
state of mind should be clearly defined as “willfulness” for criminal
violations and “recklessness” for civil violations.239 Additionally, in
terms of the tippee’s knowledge of the underlying breach, “for criminal
liability, the tippee should know that the tipper obtained or
communicated information wrongfully, and for civil liability, the tippee
should have at least recklessly disregarded that fact.”240 This will at least
limit the potential scope of criminal liability, while also providing notice
and due process.241
3. Broaden the Scope of the Personal Benefit Definition
Shifting the focus of the inquiry to “wrongfulness” presents an
opportunity to distinguish between information used for a “corporate or
otherwise permissible purpose,” and illegitimate or self-serving
purposes.242 However, retaining the personal benefit requirement
restricts this potential. Although some argue for elimination of the
personal benefit requirement altogether,243 I argue instead that it should
be kept, and the definition of “personal benefit” be broadened.

238. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 664 n.24 (1983). Often, what determines whether
a criminal or civil suit is brought in the insider trading context is not the conduct itself,
but rather the sufficiency of evidence. Peter Henning, Blurred Lines in Pursuing Insider
Trading Cases, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2016) https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/16/
business/dealbook/blurred-lines-in-pursuing-insider-trading-cases.html
[https://perma.cc/8FTV-K34T]; Walter Pavlo, Insider Trading: Civil or Criminal
Crime?, FORBES (Oct. 24, 2013, 8:15 AM) https://www.forbes.com/sites/walterpavlo/
2013/10/24/insider-trading-civil-or-criminal/#2b9aba1d6564 [https://perma.cc/EC4568D2]. For a discussion of the difference between, i.e. federal narcotics laws, and
federal insider trading laws, see Miriam H. Baer, Insider Trading’s Legality Problem,
127 YALE L.J. F. 129 (2017).
239. BHARARA ET AL., supra note 18, at 17. Although the current standard for
criminal enforcement by the Department of Justice (DOJ) is “willfulness” and the
standard for civil enforcement at the SEC is “recklessness,” this should be clearly
included in the statute defining liability itself. Id.
240. Id.
241. Cf. Baer, supra note 238, at 137, 148.
242. BHARARA ET AL., supra note 18, at 15.
243. Id.
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Currently, its meaning under the ITPA is not clear and is too limiting.
The impact of the ITPA would be minimal and only create more
confusion than already exists in current insider trading jurisprudence.
To remedy these issues, the statute’s last catchall definition of
wrongful should be amended. In addition to what is listed in Sections
(A)(c)(1)(A), (B), and (C), material nonpublic information should be
considered “wrongful” only if the information has been obtained
through means of, or its communication or use would constitute, directly
or indirectly:
(D) a breach of any fiduciary duty, a breach of a confidentiality
agreement, a breach of contract, a breach of any code of conduct or
ethics policy, or a breach of any other personal or other relationship
of trust and confidence for a direct or indirect personal benefit.
A direct personal benefit includes, but is not limited to: a tipper
receiving a pecuniary gain; or a relationship between the insider and
the recipient that suggests a quid pro quo.
An indirect personal benefit shall include: (1) a reputational benefit;
(2) a gift of confidential information to a trading relative or friend; or
(3) an increase in pay, a bonus, a job opportunity, a promotion, or
any other benefit that arises from self-serving actions lacking a
legitimate corporate purpose.

This change is advantageous because now Newman, Chiasson, and
even Maria would be found liable, but Dirks would not. For example,
investor relations employees in Newman could be described as seeking a
benefit for a bonus or promotion.244 Further, Maria was pursuing a job
opportunity by slipping a note to the hedge fund manager.245 On the
other hand, Dirks would still not face liability. The insider, Secrist, was
not seeking any sort of pay increase, bonus, job opportunity, or
promotion.246 Therefore, these additions would attain a balance between
“legitimate” and “illegitimate” corporate purposes.247
Some may argue that this provision contains ambiguities of its own
and does not properly account for the market efficiency interests at
244.
245.
246.
247.

United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 453-55 (2d Cir. 2014).
COX ET AL., supra note 14, at 892.
Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 663–65 (1983).
It is important to note that although seeking a promotion or increase in pay is
not in itself an illegitimate business purpose, exchanging material nonpublic
information in exchange for this promotion or increase in pay is. See COX ET AL., supra
note 14, at 892.
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hand. Although one could say phrases such as “self-serving” and
“legitimate corporate purpose” are new to insider trading law, these
ideas stem from Dirks itself.248 Further, although the provision certainly
does broaden the scope of insider trading liability, that is the point.
Moreover, this takes a similar approach to what is already prohibited by
Reg FD.249 Although this is broader than liability under Reg FD,250 it
attempts to seek the proper balance between improper motives, and
preservation of sufficient incentives for diligent market research.
Further, it is still a more limiting principle than eliminating the personal
benefit requirement altogether. For example, the train commuter who
trades on Jamie Dimon’s binder would escape liability as Dimon would
not attain a personal benefit there, even under the suggested broader
definition.251
CONCLUSION
The judge-made law of insider trading is long overdue for
codification in legislation. The ITPA is a step in the right direction, but
there are still improvements to be made before the statute is enacted.
The ITPA properly eliminates Newman’s requirement that a tippee
know of the personal benefit the tipper-insider gained in revealing this
information. However, the Act needs to improve in clarity, separate the
standards for criminal and civil liability, and provide a more expansive
definition of “personal benefit.” In sum, although legislation is
necessary, an ambiguous statute may make insider trading law even
more “topsy-turvy”252 than it was before.

248. Id. at 663 (“The SEC argues that, if inside-trading liability does not exist when
the information is transmitted for a proper purpose but is used for trading, it would be a
rare situation when the parties could not fabricate some ostensibly legitimate business
justification for transmitting the information.”).
249. 17 C.F.R. §§ 243.100–243.103.
250. Id.
251. In fact, if this occurred, the opposite of a promotion or increase in pay would
be the likely result.
252. United States v. Whitman, 904 F. Supp. 2d 363, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), aff’d,
555 F. App’x 98 (2d Cir. 2014).

